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INFRASTRUCTURE CRISES IN BEIRUT AND
THE STRUGGLE TO (NOT) REFORM
THE LEBANESE STATE
By Éric Verdeil
In July and August 2015, thousands of Lebanese citizens protested the con-
spicuous presence of mounds of garbage on the streets of Beirut and towns of 
Mount Lebanon. These scenes confirmed that infrastructure breakdown and 
public service disruption are symptoms of the state’s inability to fulfill the 
demands of its citizens. In light of Jawad Mouawad and Hannes Baumann’s 
call for researchers to go “in search of the state,” this article considers 
infrastructure as a site for the examination of governance and society in 
Lebanon.1 It addresses the following questions: How do we interpret the 
failure of the state to provide basic public services? How does analysis of this 
failure provide insight into the particularities of the Lebanese state? Urban 
scholars have tended to address the inefficiency and weakness of public 
institutions in Lebanon through two major paradigms: neoliberalism and 
sectarianism.2 Neoliberalism-focused analyses emphasize the state’s retreat 
from domains in which it formerly intervened, its promotion of market-led 
policies, and its creation of new, purportedly more efficient institutions 
and agencies. Urban design and construction, seen most spectacularly in 
Éric Verdeil is Professor of Geography and Urban Studies at Sciences Po.
85
Solidere, epitomize this kind of change, which leads to gentrification and 
rising inequalities in capital accumulation.3 Sectarianism-focused analyses 
explore how political groups with sectarian ties capture or use state bodies 
in order to advance their territorial and political interests, for instance by 
constructing territories of exclusive control such as the Dahiyeh (Dahiyya, 
which is itself a suburban area south of Beirut that today comprises several 
municipalities and towns), thus undermining the state’s sovereignty. But the 
categories neoliberal and sectarian are not mutually exclusive. They can be 
combined, as Mona Fawaz does when she looks at Wa‘ad, the Hizballah-led 
rebuilding project of Haret Hreik (Harat al-Hurayk) after the 2006 war that 
was central to the party’s reestablishment of political control over the resi-
dents. Fawaz reveals that Wa‘ad, nominally a sectarian formation, operates 
according to a conception of property that does not radically depart from 
neoliberal enshrinement of private ownership, as exemplified by Solidere.4 
Both paradigms emphasize how various social and political forces take 
control of state institutions in ways that contradict the autonomy central 
to Weberian theory’s conception of a state oriented toward producing the 
public good.5
Until recently, few scholars have examined infrastructure in Lebanese 
cities. Many scholars of the city elsewhere, inspired by Stephen Graham and 
Simon Marvin’s seminal work Splintering Urbanism, analyze infrastructure 
reforms in neoliberal terms and claim these reforms are to blame for wid-
ening social gaps.6 But others criticize this approach for overstating the scope 
and the effectiveness of these reforms and missing the complex trajectories 
of infrastructural change, which owe as much to contextual factors as to 
structural macroeconomic transformations.7 Infrastructure, however, can 
be a useful lens through which to observe state reconfiguration, provided 
that one does not preclude specific interpretations of state transformation.
This article draws on French sociologists Pierre Lascoumes and Patrick 
Le Galès’s conception of public policy instruments. These authors argue that 
a public policy instrument “constitutes a device that is both technical and 
social, that organizes specific social relations between the state and those 
it is addressed to, according to the representations and meanings it carries. 
It is a particular type of institution, a technical device with the generic 
purpose of carrying a concrete concept of the politics/society relationship 
and sustained by a concept of regulation.”8 Dominique Lorrain applies 
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this approach to infrastructure in his 2014 book Governing Megacities in 
Emerging Countries. Observing that in many megacities there is no formal 
government but rather political disarray, Lorrain argues that such cities are 
“de facto governed through their networked services.”9
Using these tools, Lorrain develops a conception of infrastructure 
as “second-level institutions,” which are “neither formal nor informal” 
and “guide the actors in the detail of action” without political consensus 
or shared perspectives. Political authorities and business milieus view 
networked services as vital infrastructure without which the city would 
collapse. They believe that regulating these services requires elaborating 
or reforming instruments—financial regulations, master plans, rules of 
connection—many of which are inherited from the past. Negotiations 
over these instruments result in low-level agreements. Despite being highly 
technical, and very often materially and metaphorically “blackboxed,” these 
instruments serve as an indirect means of governing the city by acting as 
“invisible pilots of collective action.”10 They illustrate a form of Foucaldian 
governmentality.11 For Lorrain, the governance of networked infrastructure 
alleviates urban splintering in most cases. He argues that infrastructure 
development typically balances the practices of big and small real estate 
developers and divisive political factions.12
Lorrain’s rather optimistic (or functionalist) claims identify the state 
with the effective delivery of public goods, even in circumstances where 
political institutions are paralyzed. By contrast, I argue that technical 
infrastructure cannot avoid the logic of decomposition that prevails in 
Lebanon. Political conflicts derail or delay almost every agreement to fix or 
upgrade infrastructure networks, contributing to the common perception 
that the state is vanishing. But the management of these public services on 
the ground, whether by ministers and other officials, technical operators, 
or private companies, merits serious analysis, as does the interplay of the 
managers with residents who use the services. 
My argument is threefold. First, public infrastructure is a site of political 
struggle. Political actors seek to make infrastructure serve certain political 
and social interests, demonstrating their belief that these state institutions 
and instruments produce a range of effects worth competing for. Second, 
I challenge the view that that neoliberalism and sectarianism are radically 
narrowing and marginalizing the state and its institutions. When it comes to 
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infrastructure, the effects of neoliberal reforms are limited, largely because 
of the actions of local business elites who seek to preserve their business 
and political-sectarian interests. But political-sectarian groups cannot 
simply place infrastructure under their rule in order to achieve territorial 
autonomy and evade the state’s authority. The evolving geography of public 
infrastructure neither reflects nor directly reinforces Lebanon’s sectarian 
geography. Third, despite failing to deliver the expected service outcomes, 
the complex assemblage of more-or-less reformed infrastructural policy 
instruments produces strong social effects in terms of wealth distribution. 
These instruments accentuate Lebanese society’s gaps and inequalities. 
This outcome is largely unintended, as is often the case with public policy 
instruments.13 It is a product of the work of state institutions, however, and 
not proof of their absence.
To make this argument, this article explores urban services in Beirut 
through the main types of instruments that successive governments and 
their advisers—commonly from the World Bank and other international 
organizations—have adopted for their reform. I distinguish three kinds 
of instruments. First, I examine the geographic boundaries of the zones 
where urban services are organized and analyze their links with other 
administrative and political territorial frameworks. Do these spatial units 
exacerbate inequalities as a result of neoliberal policies? Do they accentuate 
sectarian divides? Second, I explore the services’ financing instruments, such 
as subsidies and pricing. Which citizens—the poor or the rich—actually 
bear the costs of implementing physical and institutional changes? Can we 
identify mechanisms that protect the interests of political and sectarian 
groups? Finally, I discuss the introduction of public-private partnerships. 
By examining the procedures used by the government to regulate such 
partnerships, I identify their links to political and economic groups at the 
urban and national scales. I examine neoliberalism and sectarianism as 
opposing logics, although, as mentioned, they can be combined. Elites may 
also use these logics as discursive resources to hide other power-building 
and consolidation strategies.
After a brief discussion of the legacies of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-
91) and the main orientations of post-war reform, the article examines waste 
management, sewage, and the provision of drinking water and electricity. 
I gathered data for this study in several ways. I carried out a number of 
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interviews concerning electricity management and reforms between 2005 
and 2013 with political and administrative officials, consultants, workers, 
NGOs, and users. I also gathered extensive primary sources, such as internal 
reports and statistics, as well as press reports. The sections on the water and 
waste sectors rely more on secondary sources, as well as on a few meetings 
with officials, donors, and utility representatives.14 This article concentrates 
on dynamics prior to the 2015 protests against the garbage crisis. However, 
the analysis therein incorporates some commentaries on the crisis that 
largely corroborate my findings.
Wartime Urban Services Management and Its Legacy
A few pioneering studies analyze urban services management during the 
Lebanese Civil War.15 Their conclusions highlight several features. First, 
different factions used urban services such as water or electricity as weapons 
to achieve dominance in or reinforce power balances. Political-sectarian 
militias in highly fragmented territories replaced the state, which virtually 
ceased regulating and maintaining order. For example, Beirut’s water supply 
came from reservoirs in the mountains east of the city, a territory domi-
nated by the Lebanese Forces. The Lebanese Forces threatened to—and in 
some cases did—close sluices in order to put pressure on their adversaries, 
particularly during the 1982 Israeli invasion. Palestinian-progressive forces 
controlled the Jiyeh (Jiyya) power station south of Beirut and built a line 
to their western sector of the capital to achieve some autonomy from the 
Christian militia-controlled electric grid.16 These practices shaped recon-
struction plans. In these plans, the factors governing the development of 
power stations and water sources were not purely technical or financial. The 
plans also took into consideration how warring groups might control these 
resources if hostilities were renewed.
The war also affected network services by discouraging mainte-
nance and investment. For example, families who were forced to relocate, 
searching for safety, expanded the city into areas where service networks 
could not handle increased demand or where there were no services. The 
mass dislocation produced local shortages and network deterioration due 
to excessive demand. The lack of investment hurt both production and net-
works. Neither the government nor the militias properly maintained water 
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treatment plants and power stations. Production capacity barely increased 
despite Lebanon’s population growing by fifty percent during the war. The 
result was large-scale rationing: in the war’s aftermath, the national utility 
limited power supply to around six hours per day.17
A third consequence of the war was widespread non-payment and 
what the utilities term “theft”: illegal connections, tampering with meters, 
and so forth. The theft resulted from the state’s withdrawal and its replace-
ment by militias, which in some cases organized the pilferage themselves. 
In certain areas of the city, however, residents relied on theft as the only 
means of access to electricity, notably in informal settlements where the 
lack of building permits made legal access impossible (though in practice 
things were more complex).18 Finally, the war facilitated the emergence of 
an informal water supply drawn from illegal boreholes, a trade in (more 
or less) drinkable water, and electricity produced by private generators. 
Initially, individuals owned these generators, and then residents developed 
collectives. The second half of the war featured the formation of com-
mercial enterprises around such private service provisioning, sometimes 
supervised by militias, that charged very high prices. In the aftermath of 
the war, people wanted essential public services provision to return to 
the pre-war situation, in which the state provided services, albeit with 
difficulty.19
Infrastructure Reconstruction: 
Investment Precedes Reform
Infrastructure rehabilitation was a central priority in the Lebanese gov-
ernment’s 1990s reconstruction policy. This policy aimed to both restore 
normal living conditions and promote economic development, viewing 
functioning infrastructure as an essential condition. To achieve these aims, 
the Lebanese government obtained a great deal of financial support, largely 
from international agencies.
According to Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) 
reports for the period 1992-2010, the state prioritized the transport, electricity, 
and waste sectors, along with drinking water and sewage. The disparity 
between the vast sums invested in these services and their chaotic perfor-
mance is striking. It immediately raises questions about the effectiveness 
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Sectors Total Investment 
($ millions)
Foreign Funding 
($ millions)
Foreign Funding 
as Percentage
of Total 
Sectoral Share of 
Total Investment 
(%)
Physical Infrastructure
Electricity 1455.17 1266.89 87 14
Telecommunications 
and Post 
798.49 33.26 4 8
Transport 2625 995 38 25
Social Infrastructure
Education 1077 499 46 10
Public Health 310.23 214.36 69 3
Environment & Urbanism 83.15 58.69 71 1
Social & Economic Affairs 104.52 41.81 40 1
Essential Services
Water Supply 815.12 590.51 72 8
Sewage Treatment 650.16 382.22 59 6
Solid Waste 1558.45 33.58 2 15
Productive and
Other Sectors
Agriculture & Irrigation 114.68 87.03 76 1
Sovereign Services 161.45 10.49 6 2
Other Sectors 594.3 213.67 36 6
Overall Total 10348 4427 43 100
Table 1. Public Investment in Lebanon, 1992-2010.
Source: Council for Development and Reconstruction, Progress Report 2011, 
http://www.cdr.gov.lb/eng/progress_reports/pr102011/index.asp.
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of spending and quality of management, casting doubt on the adequacy of 
governance at both the national and urban levels. 
The situation is partly explained by the source of the loans used to 
finance reconstruction and the political and financial conditions imposed 
by the funding agencies. In the early 1990s, the Lebanese government 
had little debt and easy access to credit. Arab countries provided political 
support to Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. Israeli-Palestinian agreements 
seemed to promise a regional prosperity that would benefit Lebanon, 
offering the Arab states good prospects for returns on their investment.20 
Arab funders invested heavily, particularly in the electricity sector. In the 
late 1990s, however, the country’s growing debt became difficult to manage 
in an economic climate that was much less dynamic than anticipated. The 
governments of Salim al-Hoss (1998-2000) and Hariri (2000-2004) turned 
to multilateral and European funding sources. The new financiers granted 
loans in return for promises of structural reform, particularly in public 
water and electricity services. Concurrently, the government rapidly imple-
mented the privatization of waste management and telecommunications, 
and unsuccessfully attempted to privatize highways. Privatization was not 
the result of external pressure, but instead reflected the interests of part of 
Lebanon’s political and economic elite, which hoped to benefit directly from 
private-sector involvement.21 
Waste: Early Reform and Disputed Outcomes
In the aftermath of the war, the state immediately directed its attention to 
the waste sector. During the years of conflict, collection services nearly broke 
down and waste dumping became chaotic. Several improvised waste dumps 
on the coast became serious public health problems. These dumps provided 
justification for several large urban development projects in Beirut’s city 
center and in Bourj Hammoud (Burj Hammud).22 The government chose to 
address Beirut’s waste problems by licensing a private company, which would 
receive public funds and operate on a scale wider than the metropolitan area. 
In 1994, the CDR awarded the city’s waste collection contract to the 
local firm Sukleen. In 1997, the CDR awarded Sukomi the license for waste 
treatment and inert waste storage at dump sites. Both Sukleen and Sukomi 
were owned by parent company Averda. Sukleen’s waste collection service 
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has since expanded to cover all of Mount Lebanon, except the district of 
Jbeil (Jubayl). The CDR justified this expansion by arguing the advantages 
of an economy of scale. But Sukleen’s scale of operations and its technical 
choices have proven inefficient. The service’s costs, including treatment and 
storage, have been very high, especially compared to those in Tripoli and 
Sidon.23 Many criticize the treatment and storage on environmental grounds: 
Sukleen has overfilled its dumps and sorts waste inadequately. Prior to 2015, 
the CDR was planning to introduce waste-to-energy processes, burning 
waste to increase electricity production.24 They would have accompanied 
this change with a broader reform of the waste collection and treatment 
service in greater Beirut. The 2015 garbage crisis resulted from the CDR’s 
delay in implementing these plans and the overfilling of dump sites.
The waste sector demonstrates the problems of implementing an instru-
ment clearly inspired by neoliberal principles. The government organized the 
service according to a public license awarded following a tendering process. 
The chosen company had little experience in large-scale waste management. 
Its director, Maysara Sukkar, was a real estate developer known for his links 
to Hariri. For many observers and journalists, granting this public license to 
the private sector manifested not only the neoliberal ideology espoused by 
the CDR’s chairman, but also a degree of clientelism, since they suspected 
Sukleen of donating to the Future Movement, the Hariri family’s political 
party.25 The government regularly renewed Sukleen’s contracts without a 
competitive tendering process. Hariri’s opponents in the Najib al-Miqati 
government attempted to review ongoing contracts but failed, apparently 
as a result of clandestine networks of influence within the CDR.26
The waste sector also illustrates the tensions between the central 
government—represented by the CDR—and local authorities. According 
to Lebanese law, the municipalities are responsible for organizing and 
funding waste management services. When the government introduced the 
current system, however, most municipalities were unable to assume these 
responsibilities—hence, the centralized system. Financing came from the 
Independent Municipal Fund, whose revenue is based on a combination 
of taxes and fees. The central government collects these taxes and fees on 
behalf of the municipalities, and is supposed to redistribute them to the 
municipalities—which it does only partially and without following clear 
rules. Thus the central government finances waste management services 
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with funds drawn from the municipalities, without consulting the munici-
palities and without charging residents a dedicated waste management 
fee.27 Municipalities had different perspectives on the gradual expansion 
of Sukleen’s scope of operations to include almost the whole of Mount 
Lebanon. Some were relieved to be spared responsibility for waste manage-
ment because centralized management limits the extent of illegal dumping 
in ravines and improves the environmental situation. Others felt that they 
were paying a huge price for the service without having any input into the 
terms of operation. In the aftermath of the 2015 crisis, many have demanded 
that municipalities regain responsibility for waste services.28 Some critics 
of the current setup argue that transporting waste over long distances to 
the only two extant dump sites is one of the causes of the service’s inflated 
cost.29 But local opposition, led by the municipalities, has prevented the 
CDR from establishing new waste sites. In addition to citing environmental 
threats—and the consequences for the real estate market—municipalities 
have opposed new dump sites in parochial and sectarian terms, refusing 
to accept other communities’ waste. 
The Lebanese government’s introduction of private operators into the 
waste sector was an early reform effort.30 The public service license contract 
undoubtedly improved the previously anarchic environmental situation. 
But the government achieved this result through opaque means, which 
benefited a company with ties to certain political-financial interests, and 
whose contract was renewed without procedural transparency. In 2015, 
these contradictions and the exposure of corruption in the sector resulted 
in vibrant protests. Protesters expressed aspirations to greater control over 
this service and proposed many alternatives schemes.31 But even if these 
protests have rendered the political elites’ power more fragile, the govern-
ment’s “temporary” solutions seem to largely reproduce the status quo. Dump 
sites threaten the environment, while the government has not adopted a 
recycling strategy and has extended Sukleen’s contract.
Drinking Water and Sewage: Incomplete Reform
In a country with among the most abundant water resources in the Middle 
East, the inadequacy of Beirut’s drinking water supply exemplifies the 
persistence of public service dysfunction after twenty years of reconstruc-
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tion. Although some describe the high mountains around Beirut as the 
water tower of the Eastern Mediterranean, Beirut’s drinking water service 
is particularly poor. The sector has undergone significant institutional 
reform through a combination of territorial reorganization and com-
mercial rationalization. Initially neoliberal in inspiration, with hopes of 
private-sector involvement, the government’s approach ultimately became 
more modest. The water sector struggles to manage the resource across 
the country, against a background of political and sectarian tensions and 
unbalanced regional development.
Beirut Southern Suburbs Mount Lebanon All of Lebanon
Connection to the public 
drinking water system*
87 66 82.9 77.4
Consumption of
drinking water mains 
39.9 1.3 48.3 45.9
Use of a well** 62.5 43.1 9.5 18.2
Purchase from
water tankers
21.6 53 86.8 55.8
Connection to the
public electricity grid
100 97.3 94.5 97.8
Use of a private network 
(shared generator)
56.3 34.9 77.7 61.5
Connection to the
sewage system
99.6 96.8 64.2 65.7
Table 2. Percentage of Households Connected to and Using Selected Service Networks 
in Beirut and Environs in 2007
Source: Republic of Lebanon, Central Administration of Statistics,
Ministry of Social Affairs, Households Survey, 2007. 
* All uses.
** These figures refer to the use of a well as the primary or secondary source of drinking water.
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Beirut’s water supply is particularly poor, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively, as revealed by the household survey conducted by the Central 
Administration of Statistics (ACS) in 2007 [Table 2] and the World Bank’s 
2008 Social Impact Analysis (SIA). The percentage of households connected 
to water mains ranges, depending on the source, between eighty-seven 
and ninety-six percent, compared to around eighty percent for Mount 
Lebanon, although the percentage is lower in Beirut’s southern suburbs. 
Several factors explain this disparity within Beirut’s metropolitan area. In 
the informal neighborhoods that form a significant proportion of Beirut’s 
southern suburbs, residents must possess a building permit or complete a 
regularization process in order to connect their households to the public 
network. There are no pertinent data, but it is clear that these require-
ments exclude many residences from the public network and thus residents 
obtain their supplies by other means.32 The low percentage of connected 
households in Beirut proper seems to arise from a second factor: voluntary 
non-connection. The World Bank’s SIA survey estimated that ten percent 
of households nationwide choose not to connect to the public network. The 
survey ascribed this choice to distrust of the public system and preference 
for other sources.
The water mains are unreliable, with service in Beirut ranging from 
four hours per day in summertime to six in wintertime, and from six 
to eleven hours per day in Mount Lebanon. Intermittency rates in the 
southern suburbs are closer to those of Beirut. Intermittent service forces 
households to use rooftop water tanks or, if there is not enough pressure, 
to pump water. Demand exceeds supply, which requires people to turn to 
alternative sources—private wells, tanker delivery, direct pumping from 
reservoirs—especially in the summer. The spread of high-rise housing in 
Beirut and certain suburbs is exacerbating water pressure problems and 
stimulating the development of private, autonomous water access systems, 
often illegal wells.
A very large proportion of households consider the water main’s quality 
inadequate. The 2007 ACS survey indicates that only 1.3 percent of southern 
suburbs residents drink water from the mains, though this figure perhaps 
reflects the conditions of the survey, conducted in the months following 
the 2006 war. The SIA survey gives higher figures: sixty-two and fifty-six 
percent of Beirut and Mount Lebanon residents, respectively, stated that 
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they drink water from the mains. The rest buy bottled, tanker, or spring 
water for drinking and cooking. As a result, household spending on water 
represents a significant proportion of their expenditures, between three and 
five percent. Residents spend between half and two thirds of this amount 
on alternative water sources.33
The water company that manages service in Beirut and Mount Lebanon 
could be faring worse in commercial terms. Over eighty percent of its bills 
are paid and, in contrast to companies serving other regions, its revenues 
cover operations and maintenance.34 But the system is far from perfect for 
several reasons. First, the quantities of water the company produces and 
distributes are not meeting residents’ needs, particularly in the summer. 
Second, some assessments put network losses at thirty to forty percent. The 
rate of payment varies from one district to another, and it is significantly 
lower in the southern suburbs despite undoubted improvements since the 
1990s. The rate of illegal connection (not authorized by the water company) 
ranges between five and twenty percent. Another issue is that the distribution 
and billing system demands lump-sum payment for an estimated volume, 
generally one cubic meter per day. This system does not reflect household 
consumption patterns and so provides no incentive for efficient consumption. 
Instead, it penalizes households that consume little or would like to do so.
The Technical, Economic, and
Political Results of Incomplete Reform
Since the mid-1990s, the government, national institutions, and stakeholders 
have discussed numerous proposals to resolve the problem of water shortages. 
A number of international funding agencies are involved in these debates, 
including the World Bank, the European Union, the Agence Française de 
Développement (AFD), Greater Lyon’s decentralized cooperation agency, 
the German GIZ agency, and USAID. Law 241-2000, passed by the Lebanese 
parliament in May 2000, was a compromise among several objectives. 
The law proposed three different instruments.35 First, at the institutional 
level, it aimed to restructure regional water governance by merging the 
five water offices in Beirut and Mount Lebanon into a public water board. 
The parliament adopted a similar solution for the rest of Lebanon, forming 
three regional boards. These new institutions would also be responsible for 
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sewers. Second, the reform package had financial objectives. It intended the 
new districting to improve resource sharing across wider areas, generate 
economies of scale, and spread costs more effectively among consumers with 
different socioeconomic profiles. Finally, the reform planned to shift the 
billing system from lump-sum payment to user-pays pricing, and it advocated 
the introduction of public-private partnerships. While the government has 
implemented the reform’s redistricting proposals, the proposed reforms for 
billing and public-private partnerships have faded.
The only place where the government has contracted a private company 
to run the water treatment and supply service is the city of Tripoli. A foreign 
company, Ondeo-Suez Environnement, received the Tripoli service contract 
between 2002 and 2007, with funding from the AFD. Despite improving 
service, Ondeo-Suez withdrew due to severe problems in its relations 
with the director of the Water Authority of the North, which oversaw the 
company, and with the local political class, as well as serious instability in 
the local political situation.36 The Water Authority of the North now runs 
the service once again. This failure—or semi-failure, depending on one’s 
perspective—can also be attributed to private operators adopting much 
greater caution about contracts of this kind, which have proven less profit-
able than they anticipated in the early 1990s.37 In any case, the failure froze 
the development of private-sector partnerships in other regions of Lebanon, 
including Beirut.38
Billing arrangements—the water boards’ local prerogative—have 
not changed in Beirut. In Sidon, the Water Authority of the South has 
begun introducing water meters.39 Household surveys indicate skepticism 
about changes in public billing, despite the prospect that better service 
might reduce the total cost of water by reducing the cost of alternative 
supplies. The reluctance indicates residents’ deep distrust of public opera-
tors. Changes to the billing system—which residents perceive as water 
cost hikes—seem above all difficult to implement without increasing the 
quantities supplied.40 Ultimately, this story suggests that shortages are the 
main problem to be solved.
In Beirut, one of the factors preventing service improvements is con-
struction delays for the Bisri-Awali complex. The Bisri-Awali project is an 
ambitious plan to divert part of the Litani River first into a reservoir on the 
Bisri River, then to a reservoir on the Awali River, and finally to Beirut. The 
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project aims to better supply the thirsty city, which accounts for around sixty 
percent of national water demand.41 This expensive project has prompted 
a stack of studies and counter-studies of its technical, institutional, and 
financial aspects, going back almost thirty years. One major disagreement 
is between partisans of a “buy, operate, transfer” (BOT) scheme and propo-
nents of public management. While this disagreement reflects the conflict 
between Hariri’s supporters and opponents, there is more to it, such as the 
trans-partisan, pro-dam business lobby that is eager to win lucrative public 
works contracts. Disagreements on the project also reflect concerns about 
transferring water to the capital from the deprived, Hizballah-dominated 
regions of the south and the Bekaa Valley (Wadi al-Biqa‘).42 Some argue that 
the Bisri-Awali project conflicts with a large-scale agricultural irrigation 
project in the south that also uses water from the Litani River. This project 
has been delayed nearly fifty years, and it is only now beginning to show 
signs of implementation. Beirut’s water supply thus cannot be considered 
purely in terms of the city’s internal priorities, but it must be linked political 
balances in the rest of the country.43 A series of local resistance movements 
have halted the influence of neoliberal principles on water sector reform. The 
political elite has largely led this resistance, fearing that the implementation 
of reform threatens their influence and clientelist power.
Electricity: Symbol of Urban Services Crisis
The electricity supply crisis is the most resounding failure of post-civil 
war reconstruction. The two cases discussed above illustrate how political 
and, at times, sectarian bickering foiled policy choices with clear neolib-
eral roots. In the electricity crisis, neoliberal ambitions remained limited, 
and controversies have always directly reflected sectarianism and political 
clientelism. I begin by briefly presenting how the crisis manifested before 
analyzing the reform process.
A Crisis with a Long History
The electricity crisis is not a problem of access to the grid (see Table 2), 
although some informal neighborhoods remain unconnected or connected 
via temporary arrangements.44 It is primarily a shortage crisis. The crisis 
developed in two phases. In the first, from 1991 to 2006, the country was 
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on the road to recovery. In 2004, the average supply was twenty-two hours 
per day. In the second, following the 2006 war, the electricity supply has 
declined due to the absence of new capacity and failure to upgrade existing 
plants. In 2010, the Ministry of Energy estimated the supply deficit at more 
than one third: the utilities provided fifteen hundred megawatts to meet a 
demand for twenty-three to twenty-four thousand megawatts.45 The sector’s 
financial deficit exacerbates the crisis. A planned transition to natural gas 
would have brought savings of several hundred million dollars per year, but 
it never occurred due to geopolitical problems, first between Lebanon and 
Syria, then between Egypt and Israel. The public utility has not adjusted 
the price of electricity since 1994, when a barrel of oil cost twenty dollars, 
resulting in very low revenues. Finally, “theft” remains very common 
(around twenty percent of energy distributed is not billed), as is technical 
loss (fifteen percent). Non-payment, though less prevalent than at the end 
of the civil war, remains widespread, and has increased since 2006, as has 
theft. Électricité du Liban (EDL) loses 1.5 to two billion dollars annually, 
made up for by the treasury. The government estimated that more than one 
third of Lebanon’s debt—currently sixty billion dollars, or two hundred 
percent of GDP—results from EDL’s deficit.46
The electricity crisis is highly spatialized and regionalized. In 2004, 
forty-four percent of Lebanon’s consumers of electricity resided in metro-
politan Beirut, which increases to sixty-six percent when Mount Lebanon 
consumers are added. In 2000, metropolitan Beirut residents used forty-five 
percent of Lebanon’s total electricity, increasing to sixty-five percent with 
Mount Lebanon.47 Moreover, the rationing system is highly differentiated by 
geography, which is exacerbated by capacity inequalities in the distribution 
grids. The Beirut municipality receives a disproportionately large supply. 
It experienced practically no regular power cuts between 1996 and 2006. 
Since 2006, the situation has somewhat deteriorated and, according to the 
official supply figures, there are currently three hours of downtime per 
day. By contrast, the suburbs never received twenty-four hours per day of 
electricity, although supply improved significantly in 2004-06, when power 
cuts lasted three to four hours per day.48 Today, in the context of the overall 
deterioration mentioned above, these cuts can last as long as twelve hours 
per day. Differences in network capacity exacerbate this intermittency.49 
For example, whereas average daily demand in the southern suburbs is 
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four hundred megawatts, network capacity is only one hundred and forty 
megawatts. The number of transformers is very clearly inadequate to meet 
demand, which reflects the lack of investment in these neighborhoods. 
Conversely, in the downtown Solidere district, developers have invested 
to supply two hundred and ten megawatts while demand is currently only 
seventy megawatts.50
Government policies to resolve this crisis have varied over the years, 
but generally lacked a single, clearly defined set of priorities.51 Because of 
the complexity of the proposed reforms over the years, I divide my analysis 
of these policies into three categories: financial issues, privatization, and 
distribution.
Addressing the Financial Issue
Until around 1996, successive governments worked to restore the electricity 
networks and increase production capacity by building new plants in the 
north and south of the country. Theft diminished but remained widespread. 
Because of the damage caused during the Israeli occupation, the government 
did not suppress illegal connections. This period was marked by numerous 
scandals over construction costs, perceived by some as ways to funnel funds 
to entrepreneurs and politicians close to Syria.52 From the late 1990s, rising 
awareness of the impact of non-payment prompted the government and EDL 
to pursue theft and non-payment more vigorously. The government and 
EDL considered these customers freeloaders and deemed them responsible 
for the company’s losses. In interviews with me, EDL engineers ascribed 
these practices primarily to the Shi‘i inhabitants of the south and southern 
suburbs. Public gossip concurred with this perception. These allegations 
brought the sectarian factor right to the heart of the electricity controversy, 
although my 2009 analysis of the geographical and social distribution of 
these practices revealed a much more complex situation.53 When Gebran 
Bassil—son-in-law of Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun, 
the current president of Lebanon—became minister of water and energy, 
he contributed to sectarian stigmatization. For example, in August 2010 he 
alleged that Christians are more likely to pay than Muslims.54
These controversies leave aside financial issues related to the electricity 
tariff. The government has not increased the tariff set up in 1994 even though 
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oil prices have since boomed. The public budget has compensated for this 
structural deficit. The deficit resulted in a de facto subsidy that mostly ben-
efits large consumers, a fact that the World Bank and other officials have 
acknowledged and ceaselessly criticized.55
The sustained inequality of electricity supply between the city of Beirut, 
its suburbs, and the rest of Lebanon has also entailed an unfair repartition 
of public subsidies. On two occasions, FPM ministers—Alain Tabourian in 
2009 and Bassil in 2013—proposed that Beirut’s residents receive the same 
daily supply of electricity as other regions. The Council of Ministers refused 
on the grounds that reducing Beirut’s supply would encourage greater use 
of private generators and pollute the capital. Some believe the council’s 
refusal had more to do with protecting the heart of the country’s business 
activity, in particular the banking and financial centers and large hotels, 
that burnish Beirut’s international image. Keeping the capital’s advanta-
geous supply expressed important economic and social priorities. On one 
hand, prioritizing Beirut’s power supply could guarantee higher revenues 
compared to areas with higher non-payment and theft levels. On the other 
hand, privileging Beirut’s supply appears to many as a particularly unfair 
subsidy to the largest and wealthiest consumers, leaving residents of the 
suburbs and elsewhere to cope with expensive generators. The government 
has postponed the price hikes in order to better reflect the generation cost 
until supplies are improved. Successive energy ministers have feared that 
implementing tariff hikes before increasing supply will spark protests.
Privatizing the Electricity Sector?
Since the late 1990s, widespread criticism of the public electricity company’s 
incompetence has prompted discussion of privatization, particularly within 
Hariri’s political circle. Privatizing the electricity sector would follow the 
example of waste management and mobile telephones, recalling plans for the 
water sector. Multilateral funding agencies strongly backed this approach. 
Rafiq al-Hariri froze recruitment at EDL, obliging the company to use tem-
porary staff and subcontractors to carry out tasks it could no longer perform 
using its own resources. EDL recruited staff and allocated contracts in the 
conditions of secrecy that characterize political clientelism, and it offered 
no social and retirement benefits to the new workers, prompting further 
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accusations of mismanagement. In 2002, the government passed Act 462, 
permitting the total privatization of the sector. The law’s terms were impre-
cise however, and it was never implemented. Following 2002, privatization 
plans for sector reform proliferated, backed by foreign funding agencies. 
Every new minister instituted new studies with an almost complete lack of 
continuity. Funding of new production plants was a central issue. A number 
of private players offered to build new power stations. But the law granting 
EDL the electricity generation monopoly prevented it from buying privately 
generated electricity. Members of the 8 March alliance—made up of the FPM, 
Hizballah, and its fellow Shi‘i party Amal—disliked this solution. Charbel 
Nahhas, a minister close to the FPM, summarized the objections as fearing 
a shift from a “public monopoly to a private monopoly”56 without adequate 
regulation. Although Nahhas was commenting on telecommunications, his 
remark was equally applicable to electricity. 
In 2009 Bassil was appointed minister of water and energy. He steered 
through the Council of Ministers, and then through Parliament, a very 
ambitious plan to return to twenty-four hour per day of power within four 
years. Bassil proposed increasing production capacity, first with publicly 
financed and managed projects, and ultimately through independent power 
producers, which would entail a change in the law. He also proposed distri-
bution reform, transferring distribution to the private sector, financed by 
France and the World Bank. Interminable controversy accompanied each 
stage in this plan’s implementation. Accusations flew back and forth—of 
embezzlement, hidden interests, opposition to progress, and a desire to leave 
Lebanon in the dark. Six years later, public investment in several projects 
had begun without noticeable improvement in supply, and private projects 
remained stalled.57
Distribution Challenges:
Socio-Territorial Inequalities, 
Privatization, and Sectarianism
Bassil’s main achievement as minister was his promotion of distribution 
reform. These reforms introduced a service contract with private companies, 
with a three hundred and fifty million dollar price tag. Backed by the World 
Bank and other funding agencies, Bassil and other advocates intended these 
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reforms to make the private sector responsible for upgrading the distribution 
networks. Service providers would be responsible for collecting payments 
and combating theft. The reforms emphasized installing new meters so 
that the service providers could manage subscribers and track consump-
Figure 1. 2012 reorganization of the operating districts 
of electricity distribution in Lebanon.
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tion patterns remotely. Following a call for tenders, the ministry selected 
three companies for three sectors of operation. According to officials at the 
Higher Privatization Committee, this organizational model would generate 
competition among the companies by allowing the ministry to monitor 
their service performance.58
The reform redrew the boundaries of the service areas for these 
companies [Fig. 1]. Advocates of this reform designed it to establish regions 
with mixed economic and social profiles and well-balanced consumption 
patterns, while avoiding any alignment with political-sectarian territories. 
In contrast to reforms in waste management and water services, electricity 
reformers did not align the new operational districts with existing spatial 
administration. The result is a completely new geography of electricity 
supply. While Greater Beirut formerly constituted a single operational 
management unit for the public operator, the new districting separated it 
into three sectors. One company, BUTEC, manages Beirut’s eastern and 
northern suburbs, northern Mount Lebanon, and the northwest; the second 
(NEUC) manages an area stretching from Beirut’s southern suburbs to 
the southwest of Lebanon; the third (KwA) manages inner Beirut and the 
Bekaa Valley, two discontinuous zones. These companies began operating 
in September 2012. Four years later, neither the companies nor the govern-
ment had made official records of their activities available, and controversy 
continued concerning the renewal of the companies’ contracts.
Electricity sector workers strongly resisted these new contracts. EDL’s 
contract workers organized the longest strike in Lebanon’s recent history, 
from May to September 2012. They refused to be transferred to the operating 
companies’ employ and demanded to be fully integrated into EDL. An initial 
compromise in September 2012 was that EDL would examine the possibility 
of incorporating these contract workers into the public company and granting 
them various guarantees regarding their work for the operators. Disagreement 
on these issues persists to the time of writing. These strikes highlighted the 
issues of working conditions and recruitment because the EDL employed 
these contract workers on terms that did not comply with industrial law: no 
national insurance, no pension rights. They also revealed the sectarianism 
and political favoritism that governs EDL working conditions.59
The backers of the current electricity distribution reforms allegedly 
attempted to avoid political-sectarian factors by redefining the operating 
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parameters and procedures. But those factors have been omnipresent in the 
political factions’ perceptions of the reforms, and have delayed decisions on 
investments, the introduction of new technologies, and the implementation 
of equitable supply among the different regions. Sectarianism’s influence 
largely prevents debate on these reforms’ socioeconomic aspects, such as 
the question of working conditions revealed in the transition to contractual 
employment in public-private partnerships, or the supply inequalities among 
Beirut, its suburbs, and other regions.
Conclusion
This article has explored urban service network management in order to 
question the dominant conceptualizations of the state in Lebanon. By ana-
lyzing the policy instruments used by political figures and administrative 
officials to transform these sectors, this article has unraveled political debates 
triggered by the reforms and the tactics various stakeholders employed to 
implement, stall, or stop these projects. My most striking finding is that the 
three sectors differ substantially in management, making the state’s logic 
difficult to summarize in a unified paradigm. I now conclude by summarizing 
my findings in the three main dimensions (or families of instruments) of 
urban service reform.
The first dimension is the redefinition of operational districts. Reforms 
in this vein sought to achieve economies of scale, pool methods of action, 
and establish spatial units in which operators could earn greater revenues. A 
noteworthy product of these reforms is large-scale transformation without 
territorial convergence. The waste and water sectors adjusted to a metropolitan 
perimeter corresponding to Mount Lebanon’s administrative boundaries, 
a very broad but relevant approximation of Greater Beirut.60 By contrast, 
reformers sought to restructure electricity distribution according to quite 
different territorial principles. Proponents and critics mobilize a variety of 
technical and economic arguments to explain this difference, but, whatever 
the explanations given, it does not reflect a convergence of the new territorial 
organization with political or sectarian territories. 
The second dimension is the introduction of public-private part-
nerships. To this question, the Lebanese experience offers contradictory 
answers. Although many view urban development, particularly Solidere, as 
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a manifestation of unbridled neoliberalism, urban services do not really fit 
into their analysis. It is true that waste management is a striking example 
of poor regulation and expensive outsourcing of public service contracts, 
whose renewal under less than transparent conditions reflects the domi-
nance of partisan interests. In the water sector, however, the failure of 
Ondeo-Suez’s drinking water management contract in Tripoli seems to 
have blocked similar privatization attempts in Beirut, despite persistent 
lobbying. As for the electricity sector, Parliament’s recent opening of the 
power generation sector to independent producers has not resulted in a 
single major deal. Parts of the necessary legislative framework, such as an 
independent regulator, are still missing. The possible discovery of offshore 
gas could alter these reforms’ conditions markedly. Electricity distribution 
reforms have also privatized public services, although in a more limited 
fashion, through service contracts. Reforms in this sector have above all 
revealed the scandalous condition of workers, a product of institutionalized 
political clientelism. Yet it is too soon to measure these minor reforms’ results. 
Through inertia, Lebanon seems to be less exposed to the consequences of 
urban service liberalization, whose benefits and limitations are evident in 
Jordan and Morocco.61
The last family of instruments is funding. While reforms in each sector 
operate with different funding sources, all converge to receive money from 
the national budget. Until recently, waste and sewage services received no 
direct contribution from users. Rather, the Municipal Fund finances the 
former and water authorities’ budgets finance the latter. As for drinking 
water, users pay on a lump-sum basis. In Beirut and Mount Lebanon, these 
payments cover operating and maintenance costs. Lump-sum payments, 
however, do not account for individual consumption and provide no incen-
tive for more rational resource management. Finally, the electricity sector’s 
deficit is so large that the national budget ultimately provides most of the 
sector’s funding. In all, urban services—reformed or otherwise—remain 
primarily financed through taxation and debt, either due to public budget 
or international loan financing for projects or to operational deficits. 
Service costs are totally disconnected from place of residence and mode of 
consumption, which ultimately runs counter to commercial service prin-
ciples. The originality of these findings is methodological. They highlight 
the utility of examining policy instruments and adopting a geographical 
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approach to public policies in order to understand the territorialization of 
the state and the continuous shaping of space by state policy, even when 
those processes are dysfunctional. 
Infrastructure remains the object of popular expectations of the state. 
It is also a site of political struggle, because politicians see it as central to their 
strategies for expanding their power. Politicians have proposed numerous 
reforms of the instruments that regulate infrastructure and service delivery. 
Certain sections of the population express deep mistrust of these mostly 
liberal reforms, fearing their social consequences. But paradoxically, and 
in contrast to the idea that managing infrastructure is an indirect but effec-
tive way to govern the city, in Beirut political fragmentation prevents even 
agreements on modest improvements to key sectors to ease the burdens of 
daily life or to encourage economic growth. Hence, these reforms’ failure 
results above all from resistance by the political system—whether its partisan 
and sectarian or its regionalist and clientelist elements. Opposing factions 
paralyze state institutions. 
So loud are the controversies among the political class and wider 
population, who invariably interpret service provision deficiencies in polit-
ical-sectarian terms, that they mask the socioeconomic effects of the flawed 
public policy instruments that regulate infrastructure. Political-sectarian 
polarization has pushed socioeconomic issues to the margins of the services 
debate. For example, the taxation that funds urban services is levied very 
unequally on Lebanese citizens of different classes. The same is true of the 
electricity supply inequality between Beirut and its suburbs. The number of 
hours of electricity Beirut residents receive resembles a massive subsidy to 
the most affluent, who are also the biggest consumers. The state maintains 
a kilowatt-hour price that bears no relation to production costs in order to 
prevent popular protests. This low price provides a considerable advantage 
to the wealthiest classes. Outside Beirut proper, the wealthiest classes are 
so well equipped with alternative systems that they find the grid’s interrup-
tions tolerable, if costly. While these geographical inequalities in electricity 
supply are not identical to those in water or waste management, the social 
effects of deficient and unequal service are similar across all three sectors. 
The catastrophic mismanagement of urban services thus contributes, above 
all, to widening the country’s already frightening social inequalities. But 
the fact that reforms are stalled does not mean that the policy instruments 
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in place have stopped producing their effects. My analysis of the electricity 
tariff instrument precisely evinces that second-level institutions keep on 
shaping society, in that case for the worse. Beyond discussion of weak and 
strong states, social scientists must pay attention to the invisible mechanisms 
that structure public action.
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